Foes See U.S. Satellite Dependence as Vulnerable Asymmetric Target
Foes See U.S. Satellite Dependence as Vulnerable Asymmetric Target
Original here
Commercial Space Boom Comes with Risks, Absence of Public Debate Disturbing
By JINSA Editorial Assistant Jon Howland
The importance of space to U.S. security has shifted dramatically, one of the Pentagon's most senior military leaders declared at a security affairs conference held more than two years ago. Near space, just a few thousand miles above the planet within which all man-made satellites orbit is no longer a region from which mankind only takes pictures or through which missiles fly their ballistic paths but a "core" asset to America's war fighting capabilities. At the same time, however, the commercial space industry's explosive worldwide growth, including the booming market in imagery, communication, and navigation satellites as well as launch expertise, has called into question America's unfettered and unchallenged commercial and military access to space. Despite the fact that nearly every aspect of the commercial use of space has associated military implications if not outright uses, this urgent issue has been dangerously absent from the national debate.
Space is no longer an "enabler" but a "core" asset to modern war fighting capabilities, Army Lt. Gen. Edward G. Anderson III, the current deputy commander of U.S. Space Command, said at the 2001 Fletcher Conference, an annual meeting co-sponsored by the U.S. Army and Tufts University. Anderson contended that space has become a critical component in the United States' ability to conduct military operations. But the importance of space has not gone unnoticed by potential enemies and they are in turn developing indigenous space capabilities. The head of the U.S. Strategic Command Adm. James Ellis, told Defense News, September 15, 2003, "I guarantee you that our adversaries understand where the source of our technical prowess is." At the same time, according to a 2001 Space Commission report chaired by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, American space assets remain critically vulnerable to "those hostile to the U.S. [who] can acquire on the global market the means to deny, disrupt or destroy U.S. space systems ... nowhere else does our defense capability rest on such an insecure firmament."
While recognizing that the United States is "more dependent on space than any other nation," leaders within the Defense Department and Congress are debating whether or not to place offensive and defensive weapon systems in space in order to guarantee continued access to space while denying hostile nations the same luxury. The dissolution of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, renewed funding for "defensive and offensive counter-space capabilities" in the 2004 Bush Administration budget, and a growing global interest in anti satellite (ASAT) programs, are products of this concern. In turn, both foreign governments and strategic policy makers within the United States argue that placing weapons in space will lead to a costly and unnecessary "space war" while others believe the U.S. has no choice but to place weapons in space if it is to ensure continued American military supremacy and prevent a "Space Pearl Harbor," as the Rumsfeld report concluded.
U.S. Air Force Lt. Col. Peter Hays, an expert in the field of space weapons and the executive editor of the National Defense University's Joint Force's Quarterly, has identified four camps in the debate over the placement of weapons in space. The first contends that the United States military cannot operate nearly as effectively as it has in the last decade without the unfettered access to space the United States currently enjoys. To some observers, most notably former Senator Bob Smith (R-NH), the former Chairman of the U.S. Senate Ethics Committee, space dominance is essential and represents the "ultimate high ground" in warfare. Senator Smith has even suggested dissolving parts of the U.S. Air Force and creating a separate U.S. Space Force. Advocates of this premise strongly support the findings of a study designed to address the growing threat to American space control as directed by the Chief of Staff of the Air Force in 1996. Titled "Air Force 2025", the study declared that space is of such vital importance to the United States military that it "require(s) the placement of force application weapon systems in space ... Our national politicians need to recognize the critical nature of space systems, space vulnerabilities, and need to support pursuing space control and force application capabilities in space ... before an antagonistic nation either attacks or deploys the capability to destroy U.S. space assets and holds the nation hostage." On a somewhat lesser scale, a second camp holds that the weaponization of space is inevitable, as the Rumsfeld Space Commission concluded. Still, a third camp understands the importance of space to U.S. military projection and desires to preserve the status quo and refrain from an international "space arms race". In the fourth camp are those that Hayes refers to as "space doves". The "doves" believe that space should be off limits to military use and might even support the removal of current military navigation, communication, and imagery satellites.
Hays also identified five trends that may contribute to the deployment of space weapons in the future. First, is the relatively cheap and low-tech threat of detonating a nuclear weapon in low earth orbit. The radioactive fallout would eventually destroy U.S. reconnaissance, communication, and early warning satellites and wreak havoc estimated in the tens of billions of dollars on U.S. commercial satellites. Second, is the increasing threat to the U.S. space assets through asymmetric warfare. Both China and Russia have been cited as a cause of concern in regards to this scenario. In July 2000, the Xinhua Hong Kong News Service reprinted an article by Wang Hucheng titled "The U.S. Military's Soft Ribs and Strategic Weaknesses." Wang, a People's Liberation Army defense analyst, wrote: "For countries that can never win a war with the United States by using the method of tanks and planes, attacking the U.S. space system may be an irresistible and most tempting choice." Third, is the Bush Administration's continued development of a boost-phase intercept ballistic missile defense system. Although this technology is geared primarily at destroying incoming missiles in early stages of flight, the same technology has an inherent dual use capability for targeting satellites. Continued funding and progress towards this capability, Hays argued, will likely result in other nations pursuing a similar capacity thus resulting in a space weapon race. Fourth, that Americans and allies alike will become so dependent on space assets that the military will be called upon to defend this new "economic and strategic center of gravity" just as the military provides the world with secure access to oil today. Finally, current treaties and international laws undermine the commercial growth of space by "denying sovereignty and derivation of wealth from space". This final premise advocates that the United States take a much more aggressive role in the development of commercial space. While this avenue may not result in the weaponization of space per say, it would afford the America an opportunity to become an effective yet "benign hegemon" thus ensuring a leading role for the United States in space dominance.
The National Defense Industrial Association (NDIA) predicts by 2010, 70 percent of all satellites will be owned and operated by private companies - a dramatic increase from the 30 percent of 1996. Moreover, the majority of space-based assets will be owned by multinational businesses and not independent nation states. In fact, a major transnational space bloc of China, Brazil, and Europe was announced in August 2003. NDIA predicts that by 2010, 80 percent of all communication satellites and 20 percent of all remote sensing satellites will be transnational owned and thus transcend government censorship and increasing access to space by hostile nations and terrorist groups. Worldwide revenues derived from all aspects of the commercial space industry were estimated at $117 billion in 2001, according to the consulting firm A.T. Kearney. Between 1999 and 2010, an estimated 1,700 commercial satellites will travel in earth's orbit. And the commercial use of satellites is predicted to become cheaper, faster, and more frequent. It is estimated that commercial geo-synchronous satellites are delivered 18 months after they are ordered. In contrast, the acquisition of national security satellites runs 10 to 15 years. The technology and desire for space-based assets is accelerating the proliferation of space technology and its inherent dual-use capabilities with regards to ballistic missile technology, reconnaissance, communications, and autonomous global positioning satellites (GPS).
The ballistic missile technology required for launching satellites is spreading. This constitutes an obvious concern, as missile platforms designed to launch satellites into orbit are equally effective as surface-to-surface ballistic missiles. The procurement of ballistic missile technology is primarily by Third World nations, including those with active chemical, biological, and nuclear programs such as India, Pakistan, and Iran. North Korea continues to lead the world in missile technology proliferation. Iran recently conducted tests on their new Shahab 3 missile design, which is based on North Korea's Rodong 1 prototype, CNN reported in August. China's Precision Machinery Import-Export Corporation was sanctioned by the State Department earlier this summer for passing similar missile expertise to Libya. Missile technology purchased and developed under the guise of commercial space use affords Third World and hostile nations an increased, efficient, and relatively cheap asymmetric threat in anti-satellite capabilities against the United States and our allies, according to Thomas Mahnken, acting director of Strategic Studies at the Johns Hopkins University School for Advanced International Studies.
The commercial development and access to remote sensing satellite technologies has exploded in the last decade. Geared primarily towards the geological, environmental, and agricultural industries, commercial reconnaissance satellites have an inherent and perhaps unavoidable military application. Proliferation of space imagery for example, led to the 1992 Land Remote Sensing Act (LRSA). The LRSA sought to address the concerns of the scientific, military, and business community had regarding access to remote sensing technologies. Scientists demanded access to satellite imagery for environmental monitoring, business entrepreneurs sought the commercial benefits, and the intelligence community worried about sensitive imagery becoming publicly available. The LRSA promoted continued commercial access to U.S. imagery satellites including the Earth Observation Satellite (EOSAT) but required aggressive record keeping of who was looking where and why, along with licensing requirements from the Federal Government. The LRSA has not prevented independent national and international firms, however, from developing and acquiring their own indigenous high-resolution capabilities including businesses in India, Japan, U.S., and the European Union (EU). The Russian Soyuzkarta imagery satellite provides 5-meter resolution commercially while the American QuickBird, operated and owned by Colorado based DigitalGlobe, is reported to be capable of providing 0.61-meter resolution. France's SPOT satellite, a commercial precursor to the French military's Helios system, offers 10-meter resolution and has been in use since 1986. Moreover, autonomous commercial satellites do not avert other nations from seeking imagery from other space capable nations. Clients of Space Imaging Middle East (SIME) located in Dubai include Bahrain, Pakistan, UAE, Lebanon, and the Royal Jordanian Air Force, according to Defense News.
Retired Jordanian Air Force Brig. Gen Musa Qallab told Defense News, November 3, 2003, "Commercial satellite imagery has been of great value to civilian and military institutions in Third World countries, which seriously lack space technology and would likely never have it ... [it] has helped governments of the Arab world, and especially in the Gulf region, [with] enhanced information-gathering capabilities and [imagery intelligence] to the region's armed forces." Saddam Hussein was known to rely heavily upon commercial satellite imagery during his war with Iran. Despite being denied access to such information after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, France provided SPOT imagery to Saddam after 1991 while American troops were stationed in neighboring Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Moreover, many nations including South Africa, India, Pakistan, and Indonesia enjoy direct and unfettered access to SPOT imagery because they host direct ground stations. Countries hosting satellite-receiving stations acquire and process imagery within minutes, as opposed to the usual seven-to-ten day turn-around other nations must tolerate.
India had entered into high-level discussions with Israel for access to their new (2002) Ofeq-5 satellite imagery, with a resolution thought to be less than a half-meter, Defense News reported September 22. Such a partnership would provide India not only super high-resolution imagery, but also time sensitive data, real-time targeting (for conventional and nuclear missiles), and unprecedented mapping capabilities of the Kashmir Valley. In 2000, the Clinton Administration labeled Chinese and Indian access to Israeli space capabilities as "potentially problematic," Defense News reported. Israel continues to strive for space power status and is aggressively seeking international partnership to alleviate the high costs involved. According to the Jerusalem Post, September 7, Israel has already agreed to cooperate in space technology advancements with South Korea at a meeting in South Korea held in August. In the complex world of commercial satellite proliferation and transnational cooperation and ownership, Israel is likely to build the imagery cameras, South Korea will provide the satellite (KOSMAT-II), and Russia will supply the launch facility.
The supply of commercially available space imagery will escalate. More countries are developing independent capabilities while technology in meter resolution; cloud, night, camouflage and tree canopy penetration, and imagery enhancement are advancing and becoming increasingly available on the commercial market. Managing Director Mohammad El-Kadi of SIME, quoted in Defense News, November 3, said, "our plan is to increase (imagery) capability (of the Middle East), whereby three years from now we would be able to acquire half-a square-meter high resolution, and in nine years we would be able to acquire 25-square centimeter high resolution." Businesses from the United States, France, Russia, Japan, Israel, and South Africa have all announced their ambition of launching commercially available high-resolution satellites with less than 5-meter resolution in the near future, according to Gerald M. Steinberg, a Senior Research Associate at the Begin Sadat Center for Strategic Studies at Israel's Bar Ilan University. The rising tensions on the Korean peninsula have prompted Japan to launch 6 high-resolution imaging satellites in space by 2005, autonomous GPS by 2008, and satellites specifically designated towards a "fully operational multi-tiered missile defense system" within the next two to three years, according to Defense News, September 8. Terrorist or rogue nation access to similar high-resolution space imagery has obvious implications. It is often said that had Saddam Hussein access to commercial space imagery during Desert Storm, the famous "left hook" maneuver, which took coalition forces around Iraqi positions, would have been impossible to execute.
It was widely reported that the U.S. government exercised absolute "shutter control" on commercial imagery satellites during military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. The National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) and Denver-based Space Imaging Inc., which operates the one meter resolution Ikonos satellite, reported that the U.S. government purchased the exclusive rights to all the regional imagery taken throughout the duration of both wars. Space Imaging also photographed the Al Udeid base, the new U.S. airfield in Qatar and a major staging area for operations against Iraq. GlobalSecurity.org posted images bought from ImageSat International, an Israel-based company whose motto is "high resolution satellite imaging for anyone, anytime, anywhere," of the Air Forces B-2 stealth bomber facilities on the Indian Ocean island of Diego Garcia thus confirming the presence of American bombers within striking distance of Baghdad. NIMA has undergone a ten-fold increase (about $100 million) this year alone in purchasing exclusive rights to commercially available imagery and an estimated $500 million over the next five years.
According to a joint U.S. Space Command and NDIA estimate conducted in 1998, communication satellite revenues account for an estimated 70 percent of all space based assets. Approximately $40 billion dollars is invested in commercial communication satellites scheduled for launch throughout the next 10 years and the Commercial Space Transportation Advisory Committee of the Department of Transportation predicts an average of 33 launches per year for the next decade as the demand for access to faster and more information increases. U.S. military operations over the last decade have demonstrated the importance of space-based communications including the MILSTAR satellites for providing timely information and command and control. Indigenous communication satellites have already been launched by 14 nations so far including China, India, Indonesia and it has been reported at least five more nations including Iran and Turkey plan to do so in the near future.
At a time when space-based communication is essential to the U.S. military, American armed forces are dangerously dependent upon commercial satellites for communications and that dependence is increasing. The Defense Department has committed to a strategy of relying more on commercial satellites during military operations rather than fielding its own independent systems because of high costs and the inability to match demand. During the Balkans conflict, the U.S. military leased a high-bandwidth commercial communications satellite to support intelligence, weather, reconnaissance, and ground operations in Bosnia. Eighty percent of all space borne communications during Operations in Kosovo traveled on multinational and commercially owned satellites, up from roughly 25 percent in Operation Desert Storm according to the Air Force Association's Air Force Magazine Online, February 2000. The resulting predicament prompted General Richard Myers, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to state, "Clearly, our reliance on commercial space has created a new center of gravity that can easily be exploited by our adversaries."
Military dependence upon non-encrypted commercial satellites continues to escalate. During Operation Iraqi Freedom, the London-based mobile satellite communication company Inmarsat, which was used by coalition forces, reported its busiest month in its history during the peak of the war in March, April, and May according to a September 2 article on Space News.com. Iridium and New Skies satellites also reported massive spikes in usage and were at times overwhelmed, requiring the system to be taken down for maintenance. Moreover, Inmarsat was unable to provide the military with encrypted data transmission at 128 Kilobytes per second (kps) but only at 64 kps - a speed far too slow for the military.
At the same time, commercial satellites remain critically susceptible to enemy jamming and intelligence interception. In the early 1990s, U.S. commercial satellites were subjected to weeks of radio interference emanating from a hostile Middle Eastern nation that has not been identified by the State Department to this day. Attempts at changing frequencies failed. This August, Telstar-12, an American communications satellite stationed over the Atlantic Ocean, was successfully jammed while attempting to broadcast a Persian news TV program into Iran under the stewardship of the State Department, WorldNetDaily, an independent online newssite, reported August 7, 2003. The orbital location of Telstar-12 is beyond the range of Iran-based jamming antennas. The U.S. government, however, was able to trace the jamming signal to Bejucal - the former Soviet signals intelligence base in Cuba located some 20 miles south of Havana. Despite protests from the State Department, Cuba continued to jam, or allow the Iranian diplomatic presence in Cuba to jam Telstar-12 for weeks while pro-democratic student protests were to take place in the streets of Iran. Michael Waller of the Institute of World Politics in Washington, D.C., wrote on WorldNet Daily, August 7, 2003, "by successfully jamming a U.S. communications satellite over the Atlantic Ocean, the regimes of Cuba and Iran challenged U.S. dominance of space and the assumptions of free access to satellite communication that makes undisputed U.S. military power possible."
It has been widely reported that since 1999 Cuban leader Fidel Castro has allowed China to conduct signals intelligence interception and cyber warfare operations operation against the United States from the Bejucal facility. Cuban officials have vehemently denied involvement in the jamming and reported in August that they had located the jamming facility within an Iranian diplomatic facility and have since shut it down. Foreign policy experts doubt the veracity of this claim as the Castro dictatorship enforces a strict control over all aspects of Cuban life and would be quite aware of the operation of such sophisticated electronic transmission equipment. Non-state actors, including terrorists, have the capability to jam, intercept, and hack commercial satellites. In 2002, Reuters reported that the Chinese dissident group Falun Gong continues to successfully disrupt the Beijing government's television broadcast satellites with a flip of a switch from Taiwan. Nevertheless, according to a 1998 study conducted by the NDIA, there is little perceived threat from hostile attacks on communication satellites by the public or even the commercial space industry itself.
The United States has enjoyed a monopoly with regards to Global Positioning Satellites (GPS) for years. Public access to GPS after the KAL 007 incident in 1983, in which a Soviet fighter shot down a South Korean airliner that had drifted into Soviet airspace, has resulted in a profitable business. According to an article in the July/August 2003 Foreign Affairs penned by David Braunschvig, Richard Garwin, and Jeremy Marwell - all leading experts in science and technology at the Council on Foreign Relations - revenues from GPS related sales have increased dramatically from $500 million in 1993 to an estimated $12-16 billion in 2002. However, GPS is equally beneficial for both commercial and military purposes. While the ratio of civilian to military users stands around 100:1, military weapons are increasingly reliant upon all-weather GPS technology. The most recent war in Iraq illustrates this in that 60 percent of all munitions used in Iraq were GPS-guided, up from three percent in the Serbian conflict, according to Braunschvig. Yet increased concern over America's dominance of such a critical system has sparked other countries to develop autonomous GPS constellations. Europe has announced its aspiration to begin launching the Galileo constellation, which has an ambitious operational date of 2008. President Chirac recently stated that Europe risked becoming "vassals" to American GPS if Europe did not develop an independent capability. China too, has just launched its third Beidou GPS satellite at the end of June, for "public security" concerns among other uses according to the official Xinhua news agency. While independent development of GPS is not necessarily a direct threat to the United States, it does empower foreign and potentially hostile nations with an increased military capability including long-range precision engagement.
In 1999, U.S. military spending in space accounted for 94.8 percent of the global military space budgets, a December 18, 2002 article by the Center for Defense Information on space weapons reported. According to a 2001 study conducted by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, the U.S. had 110 military-related space satellites. Russia had 40 and the rest of the world combined possessed 20. The United States government is continuing to outspend European countries by an average ratio of 6:1. Although the United States is said to have a commanding lead in space technology, other nations, both friendly and foe, are rapidly developing autonomous capabilities both commercially and militarily. As the commercial space market accelerates, the access to space based imagery, ballistic missile technology, communications, and navigation will progress. Recent wars have demonstrated how reliant the United States has become on space-based assets for conducting modern warfare. While these assets provide the United States with an unprecedented advantage, they also create an unacceptable asymmetric vulnerability. If the United States is to remain the leader in space, law makers and military planners within the U.S. government need to appreciate the inherent dangers involved in the continued proliferation of dual-use space technology under the guise of commercialization.
According to Frank Gaffney, head of the Washington, D.C.-based Center for Security Policy, "The more people learn how dependent we (U.S.) are on space, the more likely they are to figure out, as the Chinese and Russians have, that being able to interfere with our satellites is essential to their strategic interest. The threat to space assets is real and growing."
JINSA Online, December 04, 2003
Original here
Commercial Space Boom Comes with Risks, Absence of Public Debate Disturbing
By JINSA Editorial Assistant Jon Howland
The importance of space to U.S. security has shifted dramatically, one of the Pentagon's most senior military leaders declared at a security affairs conference held more than two years ago. Near space, just a few thousand miles above the planet within which all man-made satellites orbit is no longer a region from which mankind only takes pictures or through which missiles fly their ballistic paths but a "core" asset to America's war fighting capabilities. At the same time, however, the commercial space industry's explosive worldwide growth, including the booming market in imagery, communication, and navigation satellites as well as launch expertise, has called into question America's unfettered and unchallenged commercial and military access to space. Despite the fact that nearly every aspect of the commercial use of space has associated military implications if not outright uses, this urgent issue has been dangerously absent from the national debate.
Space is no longer an "enabler" but a "core" asset to modern war fighting capabilities, Army Lt. Gen. Edward G. Anderson III, the current deputy commander of U.S. Space Command, said at the 2001 Fletcher Conference, an annual meeting co-sponsored by the U.S. Army and Tufts University. Anderson contended that space has become a critical component in the United States' ability to conduct military operations. But the importance of space has not gone unnoticed by potential enemies and they are in turn developing indigenous space capabilities. The head of the U.S. Strategic Command Adm. James Ellis, told Defense News, September 15, 2003, "I guarantee you that our adversaries understand where the source of our technical prowess is." At the same time, according to a 2001 Space Commission report chaired by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, American space assets remain critically vulnerable to "those hostile to the U.S. [who] can acquire on the global market the means to deny, disrupt or destroy U.S. space systems ... nowhere else does our defense capability rest on such an insecure firmament."
While recognizing that the United States is "more dependent on space than any other nation," leaders within the Defense Department and Congress are debating whether or not to place offensive and defensive weapon systems in space in order to guarantee continued access to space while denying hostile nations the same luxury. The dissolution of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, renewed funding for "defensive and offensive counter-space capabilities" in the 2004 Bush Administration budget, and a growing global interest in anti satellite (ASAT) programs, are products of this concern. In turn, both foreign governments and strategic policy makers within the United States argue that placing weapons in space will lead to a costly and unnecessary "space war" while others believe the U.S. has no choice but to place weapons in space if it is to ensure continued American military supremacy and prevent a "Space Pearl Harbor," as the Rumsfeld report concluded.
U.S. Air Force Lt. Col. Peter Hays, an expert in the field of space weapons and the executive editor of the National Defense University's Joint Force's Quarterly, has identified four camps in the debate over the placement of weapons in space. The first contends that the United States military cannot operate nearly as effectively as it has in the last decade without the unfettered access to space the United States currently enjoys. To some observers, most notably former Senator Bob Smith (R-NH), the former Chairman of the U.S. Senate Ethics Committee, space dominance is essential and represents the "ultimate high ground" in warfare. Senator Smith has even suggested dissolving parts of the U.S. Air Force and creating a separate U.S. Space Force. Advocates of this premise strongly support the findings of a study designed to address the growing threat to American space control as directed by the Chief of Staff of the Air Force in 1996. Titled "Air Force 2025", the study declared that space is of such vital importance to the United States military that it "require(s) the placement of force application weapon systems in space ... Our national politicians need to recognize the critical nature of space systems, space vulnerabilities, and need to support pursuing space control and force application capabilities in space ... before an antagonistic nation either attacks or deploys the capability to destroy U.S. space assets and holds the nation hostage." On a somewhat lesser scale, a second camp holds that the weaponization of space is inevitable, as the Rumsfeld Space Commission concluded. Still, a third camp understands the importance of space to U.S. military projection and desires to preserve the status quo and refrain from an international "space arms race". In the fourth camp are those that Hayes refers to as "space doves". The "doves" believe that space should be off limits to military use and might even support the removal of current military navigation, communication, and imagery satellites.
Hays also identified five trends that may contribute to the deployment of space weapons in the future. First, is the relatively cheap and low-tech threat of detonating a nuclear weapon in low earth orbit. The radioactive fallout would eventually destroy U.S. reconnaissance, communication, and early warning satellites and wreak havoc estimated in the tens of billions of dollars on U.S. commercial satellites. Second, is the increasing threat to the U.S. space assets through asymmetric warfare. Both China and Russia have been cited as a cause of concern in regards to this scenario. In July 2000, the Xinhua Hong Kong News Service reprinted an article by Wang Hucheng titled "The U.S. Military's Soft Ribs and Strategic Weaknesses." Wang, a People's Liberation Army defense analyst, wrote: "For countries that can never win a war with the United States by using the method of tanks and planes, attacking the U.S. space system may be an irresistible and most tempting choice." Third, is the Bush Administration's continued development of a boost-phase intercept ballistic missile defense system. Although this technology is geared primarily at destroying incoming missiles in early stages of flight, the same technology has an inherent dual use capability for targeting satellites. Continued funding and progress towards this capability, Hays argued, will likely result in other nations pursuing a similar capacity thus resulting in a space weapon race. Fourth, that Americans and allies alike will become so dependent on space assets that the military will be called upon to defend this new "economic and strategic center of gravity" just as the military provides the world with secure access to oil today. Finally, current treaties and international laws undermine the commercial growth of space by "denying sovereignty and derivation of wealth from space". This final premise advocates that the United States take a much more aggressive role in the development of commercial space. While this avenue may not result in the weaponization of space per say, it would afford the America an opportunity to become an effective yet "benign hegemon" thus ensuring a leading role for the United States in space dominance.
The National Defense Industrial Association (NDIA) predicts by 2010, 70 percent of all satellites will be owned and operated by private companies - a dramatic increase from the 30 percent of 1996. Moreover, the majority of space-based assets will be owned by multinational businesses and not independent nation states. In fact, a major transnational space bloc of China, Brazil, and Europe was announced in August 2003. NDIA predicts that by 2010, 80 percent of all communication satellites and 20 percent of all remote sensing satellites will be transnational owned and thus transcend government censorship and increasing access to space by hostile nations and terrorist groups. Worldwide revenues derived from all aspects of the commercial space industry were estimated at $117 billion in 2001, according to the consulting firm A.T. Kearney. Between 1999 and 2010, an estimated 1,700 commercial satellites will travel in earth's orbit. And the commercial use of satellites is predicted to become cheaper, faster, and more frequent. It is estimated that commercial geo-synchronous satellites are delivered 18 months after they are ordered. In contrast, the acquisition of national security satellites runs 10 to 15 years. The technology and desire for space-based assets is accelerating the proliferation of space technology and its inherent dual-use capabilities with regards to ballistic missile technology, reconnaissance, communications, and autonomous global positioning satellites (GPS).
The ballistic missile technology required for launching satellites is spreading. This constitutes an obvious concern, as missile platforms designed to launch satellites into orbit are equally effective as surface-to-surface ballistic missiles. The procurement of ballistic missile technology is primarily by Third World nations, including those with active chemical, biological, and nuclear programs such as India, Pakistan, and Iran. North Korea continues to lead the world in missile technology proliferation. Iran recently conducted tests on their new Shahab 3 missile design, which is based on North Korea's Rodong 1 prototype, CNN reported in August. China's Precision Machinery Import-Export Corporation was sanctioned by the State Department earlier this summer for passing similar missile expertise to Libya. Missile technology purchased and developed under the guise of commercial space use affords Third World and hostile nations an increased, efficient, and relatively cheap asymmetric threat in anti-satellite capabilities against the United States and our allies, according to Thomas Mahnken, acting director of Strategic Studies at the Johns Hopkins University School for Advanced International Studies.
The commercial development and access to remote sensing satellite technologies has exploded in the last decade. Geared primarily towards the geological, environmental, and agricultural industries, commercial reconnaissance satellites have an inherent and perhaps unavoidable military application. Proliferation of space imagery for example, led to the 1992 Land Remote Sensing Act (LRSA). The LRSA sought to address the concerns of the scientific, military, and business community had regarding access to remote sensing technologies. Scientists demanded access to satellite imagery for environmental monitoring, business entrepreneurs sought the commercial benefits, and the intelligence community worried about sensitive imagery becoming publicly available. The LRSA promoted continued commercial access to U.S. imagery satellites including the Earth Observation Satellite (EOSAT) but required aggressive record keeping of who was looking where and why, along with licensing requirements from the Federal Government. The LRSA has not prevented independent national and international firms, however, from developing and acquiring their own indigenous high-resolution capabilities including businesses in India, Japan, U.S., and the European Union (EU). The Russian Soyuzkarta imagery satellite provides 5-meter resolution commercially while the American QuickBird, operated and owned by Colorado based DigitalGlobe, is reported to be capable of providing 0.61-meter resolution. France's SPOT satellite, a commercial precursor to the French military's Helios system, offers 10-meter resolution and has been in use since 1986. Moreover, autonomous commercial satellites do not avert other nations from seeking imagery from other space capable nations. Clients of Space Imaging Middle East (SIME) located in Dubai include Bahrain, Pakistan, UAE, Lebanon, and the Royal Jordanian Air Force, according to Defense News.
Retired Jordanian Air Force Brig. Gen Musa Qallab told Defense News, November 3, 2003, "Commercial satellite imagery has been of great value to civilian and military institutions in Third World countries, which seriously lack space technology and would likely never have it ... [it] has helped governments of the Arab world, and especially in the Gulf region, [with] enhanced information-gathering capabilities and [imagery intelligence] to the region's armed forces." Saddam Hussein was known to rely heavily upon commercial satellite imagery during his war with Iran. Despite being denied access to such information after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, France provided SPOT imagery to Saddam after 1991 while American troops were stationed in neighboring Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Moreover, many nations including South Africa, India, Pakistan, and Indonesia enjoy direct and unfettered access to SPOT imagery because they host direct ground stations. Countries hosting satellite-receiving stations acquire and process imagery within minutes, as opposed to the usual seven-to-ten day turn-around other nations must tolerate.
India had entered into high-level discussions with Israel for access to their new (2002) Ofeq-5 satellite imagery, with a resolution thought to be less than a half-meter, Defense News reported September 22. Such a partnership would provide India not only super high-resolution imagery, but also time sensitive data, real-time targeting (for conventional and nuclear missiles), and unprecedented mapping capabilities of the Kashmir Valley. In 2000, the Clinton Administration labeled Chinese and Indian access to Israeli space capabilities as "potentially problematic," Defense News reported. Israel continues to strive for space power status and is aggressively seeking international partnership to alleviate the high costs involved. According to the Jerusalem Post, September 7, Israel has already agreed to cooperate in space technology advancements with South Korea at a meeting in South Korea held in August. In the complex world of commercial satellite proliferation and transnational cooperation and ownership, Israel is likely to build the imagery cameras, South Korea will provide the satellite (KOSMAT-II), and Russia will supply the launch facility.
The supply of commercially available space imagery will escalate. More countries are developing independent capabilities while technology in meter resolution; cloud, night, camouflage and tree canopy penetration, and imagery enhancement are advancing and becoming increasingly available on the commercial market. Managing Director Mohammad El-Kadi of SIME, quoted in Defense News, November 3, said, "our plan is to increase (imagery) capability (of the Middle East), whereby three years from now we would be able to acquire half-a square-meter high resolution, and in nine years we would be able to acquire 25-square centimeter high resolution." Businesses from the United States, France, Russia, Japan, Israel, and South Africa have all announced their ambition of launching commercially available high-resolution satellites with less than 5-meter resolution in the near future, according to Gerald M. Steinberg, a Senior Research Associate at the Begin Sadat Center for Strategic Studies at Israel's Bar Ilan University. The rising tensions on the Korean peninsula have prompted Japan to launch 6 high-resolution imaging satellites in space by 2005, autonomous GPS by 2008, and satellites specifically designated towards a "fully operational multi-tiered missile defense system" within the next two to three years, according to Defense News, September 8. Terrorist or rogue nation access to similar high-resolution space imagery has obvious implications. It is often said that had Saddam Hussein access to commercial space imagery during Desert Storm, the famous "left hook" maneuver, which took coalition forces around Iraqi positions, would have been impossible to execute.
It was widely reported that the U.S. government exercised absolute "shutter control" on commercial imagery satellites during military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. The National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) and Denver-based Space Imaging Inc., which operates the one meter resolution Ikonos satellite, reported that the U.S. government purchased the exclusive rights to all the regional imagery taken throughout the duration of both wars. Space Imaging also photographed the Al Udeid base, the new U.S. airfield in Qatar and a major staging area for operations against Iraq. GlobalSecurity.org posted images bought from ImageSat International, an Israel-based company whose motto is "high resolution satellite imaging for anyone, anytime, anywhere," of the Air Forces B-2 stealth bomber facilities on the Indian Ocean island of Diego Garcia thus confirming the presence of American bombers within striking distance of Baghdad. NIMA has undergone a ten-fold increase (about $100 million) this year alone in purchasing exclusive rights to commercially available imagery and an estimated $500 million over the next five years.
According to a joint U.S. Space Command and NDIA estimate conducted in 1998, communication satellite revenues account for an estimated 70 percent of all space based assets. Approximately $40 billion dollars is invested in commercial communication satellites scheduled for launch throughout the next 10 years and the Commercial Space Transportation Advisory Committee of the Department of Transportation predicts an average of 33 launches per year for the next decade as the demand for access to faster and more information increases. U.S. military operations over the last decade have demonstrated the importance of space-based communications including the MILSTAR satellites for providing timely information and command and control. Indigenous communication satellites have already been launched by 14 nations so far including China, India, Indonesia and it has been reported at least five more nations including Iran and Turkey plan to do so in the near future.
At a time when space-based communication is essential to the U.S. military, American armed forces are dangerously dependent upon commercial satellites for communications and that dependence is increasing. The Defense Department has committed to a strategy of relying more on commercial satellites during military operations rather than fielding its own independent systems because of high costs and the inability to match demand. During the Balkans conflict, the U.S. military leased a high-bandwidth commercial communications satellite to support intelligence, weather, reconnaissance, and ground operations in Bosnia. Eighty percent of all space borne communications during Operations in Kosovo traveled on multinational and commercially owned satellites, up from roughly 25 percent in Operation Desert Storm according to the Air Force Association's Air Force Magazine Online, February 2000. The resulting predicament prompted General Richard Myers, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to state, "Clearly, our reliance on commercial space has created a new center of gravity that can easily be exploited by our adversaries."
Military dependence upon non-encrypted commercial satellites continues to escalate. During Operation Iraqi Freedom, the London-based mobile satellite communication company Inmarsat, which was used by coalition forces, reported its busiest month in its history during the peak of the war in March, April, and May according to a September 2 article on Space News.com. Iridium and New Skies satellites also reported massive spikes in usage and were at times overwhelmed, requiring the system to be taken down for maintenance. Moreover, Inmarsat was unable to provide the military with encrypted data transmission at 128 Kilobytes per second (kps) but only at 64 kps - a speed far too slow for the military.
At the same time, commercial satellites remain critically susceptible to enemy jamming and intelligence interception. In the early 1990s, U.S. commercial satellites were subjected to weeks of radio interference emanating from a hostile Middle Eastern nation that has not been identified by the State Department to this day. Attempts at changing frequencies failed. This August, Telstar-12, an American communications satellite stationed over the Atlantic Ocean, was successfully jammed while attempting to broadcast a Persian news TV program into Iran under the stewardship of the State Department, WorldNetDaily, an independent online newssite, reported August 7, 2003. The orbital location of Telstar-12 is beyond the range of Iran-based jamming antennas. The U.S. government, however, was able to trace the jamming signal to Bejucal - the former Soviet signals intelligence base in Cuba located some 20 miles south of Havana. Despite protests from the State Department, Cuba continued to jam, or allow the Iranian diplomatic presence in Cuba to jam Telstar-12 for weeks while pro-democratic student protests were to take place in the streets of Iran. Michael Waller of the Institute of World Politics in Washington, D.C., wrote on WorldNet Daily, August 7, 2003, "by successfully jamming a U.S. communications satellite over the Atlantic Ocean, the regimes of Cuba and Iran challenged U.S. dominance of space and the assumptions of free access to satellite communication that makes undisputed U.S. military power possible."
It has been widely reported that since 1999 Cuban leader Fidel Castro has allowed China to conduct signals intelligence interception and cyber warfare operations operation against the United States from the Bejucal facility. Cuban officials have vehemently denied involvement in the jamming and reported in August that they had located the jamming facility within an Iranian diplomatic facility and have since shut it down. Foreign policy experts doubt the veracity of this claim as the Castro dictatorship enforces a strict control over all aspects of Cuban life and would be quite aware of the operation of such sophisticated electronic transmission equipment. Non-state actors, including terrorists, have the capability to jam, intercept, and hack commercial satellites. In 2002, Reuters reported that the Chinese dissident group Falun Gong continues to successfully disrupt the Beijing government's television broadcast satellites with a flip of a switch from Taiwan. Nevertheless, according to a 1998 study conducted by the NDIA, there is little perceived threat from hostile attacks on communication satellites by the public or even the commercial space industry itself.
The United States has enjoyed a monopoly with regards to Global Positioning Satellites (GPS) for years. Public access to GPS after the KAL 007 incident in 1983, in which a Soviet fighter shot down a South Korean airliner that had drifted into Soviet airspace, has resulted in a profitable business. According to an article in the July/August 2003 Foreign Affairs penned by David Braunschvig, Richard Garwin, and Jeremy Marwell - all leading experts in science and technology at the Council on Foreign Relations - revenues from GPS related sales have increased dramatically from $500 million in 1993 to an estimated $12-16 billion in 2002. However, GPS is equally beneficial for both commercial and military purposes. While the ratio of civilian to military users stands around 100:1, military weapons are increasingly reliant upon all-weather GPS technology. The most recent war in Iraq illustrates this in that 60 percent of all munitions used in Iraq were GPS-guided, up from three percent in the Serbian conflict, according to Braunschvig. Yet increased concern over America's dominance of such a critical system has sparked other countries to develop autonomous GPS constellations. Europe has announced its aspiration to begin launching the Galileo constellation, which has an ambitious operational date of 2008. President Chirac recently stated that Europe risked becoming "vassals" to American GPS if Europe did not develop an independent capability. China too, has just launched its third Beidou GPS satellite at the end of June, for "public security" concerns among other uses according to the official Xinhua news agency. While independent development of GPS is not necessarily a direct threat to the United States, it does empower foreign and potentially hostile nations with an increased military capability including long-range precision engagement.
In 1999, U.S. military spending in space accounted for 94.8 percent of the global military space budgets, a December 18, 2002 article by the Center for Defense Information on space weapons reported. According to a 2001 study conducted by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, the U.S. had 110 military-related space satellites. Russia had 40 and the rest of the world combined possessed 20. The United States government is continuing to outspend European countries by an average ratio of 6:1. Although the United States is said to have a commanding lead in space technology, other nations, both friendly and foe, are rapidly developing autonomous capabilities both commercially and militarily. As the commercial space market accelerates, the access to space based imagery, ballistic missile technology, communications, and navigation will progress. Recent wars have demonstrated how reliant the United States has become on space-based assets for conducting modern warfare. While these assets provide the United States with an unprecedented advantage, they also create an unacceptable asymmetric vulnerability. If the United States is to remain the leader in space, law makers and military planners within the U.S. government need to appreciate the inherent dangers involved in the continued proliferation of dual-use space technology under the guise of commercialization.
According to Frank Gaffney, head of the Washington, D.C.-based Center for Security Policy, "The more people learn how dependent we (U.S.) are on space, the more likely they are to figure out, as the Chinese and Russians have, that being able to interfere with our satellites is essential to their strategic interest. The threat to space assets is real and growing."
JINSA Online, December 04, 2003
posted by JDS at 4:26 AM
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